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Copyright (c) 1999 The Columbia Law Review
Columbia Law Review
January, 1999

99 Colum. L. Rev. 129

NOTES

EMPOWERING OURSELVES: THE ROLE OF WOMEN'S NGOs
IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE WOMEN'S CONVENTION

Afra Afsharipour

[*129]

Since its adoption in 1979, one hundred and sixty nations have ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. However, due to a lack of effective enforcement mechanisms, the Convention's success in improving the lives of women has been limited. The Convention does not grant individuals a right of petition, and its requirements are not judicially enforceable. Instead, it has relied on governments to report to a United Nations committee of experts on their efforts to eradicate discrimination against women. This Note uses recent developments in Bangladesh to argue that women's non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have the potential to fill the enforcement gap in the existing system.

Bangladesh, a country with a poor record on women's rights, originally took a lax posture towards achieving the Convention's objectives. Leading up to and following the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, China in 1995, Bangladeshi and international women's NGOs were able to dramatically improve the government's attitude towards the Convention's requirements. This commitment has led in turn to substantive results.
This Note argues that women's NGOs, using methods similar to those employed in Bangladesh, can increase compliance with the Convention. By leveraging their access to the citizenry into participation in the Convention's reporting and evaluation process, women's NGOs can increase government accountability and implementation. However, the Note also cautions that women's NGOs, while assisting national governments, must retain their identity as advocates for women's rights and their ability to criticize and exert pressure on governments.


INTRODUCTION

In countries throughout the world, there are rampant violations of women's human rights. [n1] Women everywhere experience marginalization, oppression, and abuse. [n2] The Convention on the Elimination of All [*130] Forms of Discrimination Against Women [n3] ("Convention" or "Women's Convention") was adopted in 1979 in response to the problems of women and to promote the human rights of women. The issues addressed by the Convention include women's equality before the law, women's rights in the family, and women's access to health care and education, among many others. While the Convention has been essential in articulating women's human rights and in bringing greater attention to such rights, it has not been fully implemented by the States Parties. [n4]

Criticism of the Convention has not primarily been focused on its substantive provisions, but rather on its lack of enforcement provisions. There are essentially two enforcement measures under the Convention. The first method of enforcement is Article 29's State to State complaints mechanism - a measure that has yet to be invoked. [n5] The State reporting process, the Convention's second method of enforcement, is the system presently most often used. [n6] Despite the obligation to report and the fact that States have signed a multilateral treaty to take all necessary steps to [*131] advance women's rights, many have failed to take such steps. [n7] Critics of the Convention believe that this failure arises, in part, because there is no judicial enforcement of the Convention and because presentation of State reports on the status of women is the only active enforcement provision. Unlike some other human rights treaties, [n8] the Convention does not give individuals a right of petition to the committee responsible for reviewing government compliance with the Convention, nor does it give the United Nations committee responsible for monitoring the Convention's implementation, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW or the "Committee"), much power in promoting and enforcing women's human rights.

This Note asserts, however, that the lack of judicial enforcement of the Convention does not necessarily diminish its effectiveness. Reporting can be used productively, especially by women's non-governmental organizations (women's NGOs). [n9] The reporting process can serve as an important empowerment tool for women, allowing them to fight for their rights, to monitor State compliance with the Women's Convention, and to become important actors in enforcing the Convention. In fact, the reporting process has served as an empowerment tool for women. For example, in Bangladesh, a country in which women's human rights have systematically been violated, the reporting process has become an important tool in advancing women's human rights because it has allowed Bangladeshi women and women's NGOs to become involved in the enforcement of the Convention. [n10]

This Note explores the involvement of women's NGOs in enforcing the Convention. Part I provides a brief background on women's human rights and outlines the substantive and enforcement provisions of the Convention. It also addresses problems with the Convention-dictated en [*132] forcement mechanisms. Part II presents Bangladesh as a case study. While there are extensive violations of women's human rights in Bangladesh, there is also remarkable progress in the State's recognition of its obligations under the Convention. The history of Bangladesh is an example of both the problematic aspects of the enforcement mechanisms under the Convention, and how women's NGOs have involved themselves in the implementation process of the Convention. Part III uses the Bangladesh case study and the recent increased activities of international women's NGOs to illustrate how women have asserted themselves in the U.N. system, particularly in the processes laid out by the Convention, and explores both the achievements of women's NGOs and their future in the enforcement of the Convention.

This Note ultimately demonstrates that, in the recent past, women's NGOs have become major players in the national and international system, elevating themselves to a position from which they can have significant effects in enforcing the treaty obligations of States who have ratified the Women's Convention.

I. WOMEN AND HUMAN RIGHTS


A. Violations of Women's Human Rights

Two of the most important movements of this century have been the struggles for human rights and for women's equality. The right to full enjoyment of human rights by both women and men has become a universally accepted principle. [n11] However, while most countries have made some progress in advancing human rights, women's rights are still often violated.

Invidious violations of women's human rights take place in every country and in countless forms - rape, domestic abuse, exploitation of young girls, trafficking of women and girls, sexual harassment, dowry death, violence by acid - and remain a major impediment to the realization of women's rights. [n12] For women, the personal, economic, and social costs of these acts of violence are high. For example, in India, dowry deaths are on the rise, exemplifying deep-rooted and invidious abuse of women, who are often considered commodities or things to be possessed. [n13] Women in the United States continue to face abuse at home [*133] and harassment in the workplace. [n14] And in Bangladesh, some young women have had acid thrown on their faces, disfiguring them forever. [n15]

Acts of violence are not the only violations of women's human rights. Despite progress in education and employment opportunities, women are still under-represented in political decision making arenas. [n16] Furthermore, in many regions, personal laws continue to discriminate against women, denying them fair process and treatment in matters regarding marriage, maintenance, child custody, and inheritance. [n17] This summary surveys just some of the persistent forms of discrimination against women.

B. The Women's Convention: A Solution for Advancing the Human Rights of Women

In order to recognize women's human rights and to condemn the devastating consequences of violations of women's rights, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Women's Convention, which is, in essence, the international bill of rights for women. [n18] The Convention has been described as "the definitive international legal instrument requiring respect for and observance of the human rights of women; it is universal in reach, comprehensive in scope and legally binding in character." [n19] The Convention brings together provisions from existing human rights [*134] instruments [n20] concerning discrimination on the basis of sex and extends them further, creating an official, internationally sanctioned method of redress for combating discrimination against women. [n21] By exposing and highlighting continuing discrimination, the Convention articulates the insufficiency of the international human rights machinery in guaranteeing protection of women's human rights.

The Convention's preamble reaffirms the Charter of the United Nations' faith in fundamental human rights and the equal rights of men and women, and states that
discrimination against women violates the principles of equality of rights and respect for human dignity, is an obstacle to the participation of women, on equal terms with men, in the political, social, economic and cultural life of their countries, hampers the growth of the prosperity of society and the family and makes more difficult the full development of the potentialities of women in service of their countries and of humanity. [n22]

 

This preamble links women's rights to human rights generally and reminds the international community that all human rights treaties adopted by the United Nations and its specialized agencies entitle men and women to enjoy equally the rights they enshrine.

The preamble is followed by thirty operative articles that impose legal obligations on States which have ratified or acceded to the Convention. In Article 1 of the Convention, discrimination against women is defined as:

any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field. [n23]

The comprehensive definition of discrimination is meant to address the multi-faceted nature of the problems women face. Since States are bound to eliminate discrimination as defined by Article 1, they are obliged to eliminate discrimination against women in all spheres of life, [*135] including the private sphere - especially in the family. [n24] This includes not only eliminating practices that are intended ("purpose") to constrain women's human rights but also those that result ("effect") in impairing women's rights. [n25] In pursuing these goals, States may even introduce temporary affirmative action measures until equality between women and men is achieved. [n26]

Articles 1 through 16, the sixteen substantive articles, identify specific areas that particularly concern women. Part I (Articles 1 through 6) obliges States to take all appropriate measures to bring about advancement of women. Article 2 obliges them to take concrete steps to eliminate discrimination against women. [n27] The Convention does not address only actions by the State; it requires States to eliminate discrimination against women by any person, organization, or enterprise. [n28] This provision makes the Convention unique, since international human rights treaties are usually limited to the conduct of the State or its agencies. [n29] The Convention also recognizes the influence of culture and tradition in restricting women's enjoyment of rights. [n30]

[*136] In Part II (Articles 7 through 9), States agree to protect women's rights in political and public life. [n31] Women must be given equal opportunity to represent their governments and to participate in the work of international organizations. [n32] Furthermore, the Convention addresses the rights of women and their children to nationality, granting women equal rights with men to acquire, change, retain, and pass on their nationality. [n33]

In Part III (Articles 10 through 14), States make commitments to eliminate discrimination in education, employment, health, economic, social, and cultural life. In the area of education, the Convention deals with access to education as well as the substance of the education. [n34] States also have a number of obligations to advance the role of women in the workplace. [n35] Article 12 of the Convention constitutes the only inter [*137] national treaty obligation relating to family planning. [n36] Article 13 attempts to ameliorate the lack of participation by women in economic and recreational activities. [n37] The Convention also addresses the problems faced by rural women, obliging States to ensure rural women their human rights. [n38]

The last set of substantive provisions is included in Part IV (Articles 15 & 16), where States agree to afford women equality with men in the exercise of legal rights and in marriage and family law. Article 15 of the Convention guarantees equality before the law and equality of legal rights [*138] generally. [n39] Article 16 more specifically provides that States are obliged to ensure equality in marriage and family relations. [n40]

C. Enforcement Under the Women's Convention

There are essentially two enforcement measures under the Convention. The first, a rarely invoked measure allowing State to State complaints, is detailed in Article 29. The second, the State reporting process, is the system presently used for enforcement of the Convention. This mandatory reporting obligation is currently the Convention's only active enforcement mechanism.

1. State to State Complaints. - Before considering the reporting process, it is important to note that the Convention has an often forgotten provision allowing referral of State to State disputes regarding the interpretation of the Convention to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). [n41] A State that has a conflict with another State Party concerning the interpretation of application of the Convention can at first request that the dispute be submitted to arbitration. [n42] If, within six months of such request, the States are unable to agree on the procedure for the arbitration, any one of them may refer the dispute to the ICJ. [n43] While this process could allow States to monitor other States in their application of the [*139] Convention, no State has ever invoked Article 29, and in fact Article 29 is the subject of reservation by many States. [n44]

2. The State Reporting Process. - The Convention's main mechanism for enforcement is the reporting system established by Article 18. In addition to binding themselves to protecting women's rights under the Convention's substantive articles, [n45] States also undertake to submit reports on the measures they have adopted to give effect to the Convention, and the difficulties they have encountered in implementing the Convention. [n46] States Parties are obliged to submit an initial report within one year of ratification and, thereafter, to submit periodic reports at least every four years. [n47] Reports are submitted to the Secretary General of the U.N., who forwards them to CEDAW. [n48]

CEDAW is a 23-member committee established under Article 17 for the purposes of facilitating the reporting mechanism of and general compliance with the Convention. [n49] The Convention assumes that the major function of CEDAW is to consider States' reports. The Committee's power lies in its ability to review reports, examine how the reporting States are implementing their obligations, and subject the reporting government to international scrutiny. [n50] CEDAW may make suggestions and general recommendations based on the reports. [n51] It may not, however, impose sanctions or arbitrate cases either between governments or between a government and an individual.

According to Article 17(1), Committee members are to be individuals of "high moral standing and competence in the field covered by the Convention." [n52] Furthermore, in the selection of experts, consideration is given to equitable geographical distribution, as well as to representation of different legal systems. [n53] While Committee members are nominated [*140] by their governments, they are to serve in their personal capacity, not as delegates or representatives of their countries of origin. n54 This is to ensure that their primary interest is to promote women's human rights rather than to promote individual States' policies.

Under Article 18, States Parties are required to submit to CEDAW a report that explains the legislative, judicial, and administrative measures that they have adopted to give effect to the Convention, as well as information on obstacles that were encountered. [n55] Without the reports, CEDAW does not have information on and cannot review the status of women's human rights in the States. Unlike the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, [n56] the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, [n57] and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, [n58] the Convention has no right of petition that would allow individuals to make complaints about violations. [n59] Since there is no individual petition process and no other real means for judicial enforcement of the Convention, reporting is the only tool available for inducing States to comply with their treaty obligations.

Ideally, the reporting process can be a dynamic force for change within a State:
Preparation of the report should provide an opportunity for review of domestic law, policy and practice to determine the extent to which the standards of the Convention have been met. It allows for monitoring, assessment and evaluation of the strategies put in place to advance the Convention's ideals and provides an opportunity for accurate assessment of the problems that impede the implementation of the Convention. Strengths and weaknesses are submitted to public scrutiny, while consideration of the report by CEDAW provides a forum for discussion with a wholly independent body whose [purpose] is to provide constructive assistance so that States meet their treaty obligations. [n60]

In order to facilitate the production of reports, CEDAW has adopted guidelines for the form and content of the reports. [n61] The guidelines for [*141] the initial reports, which States must submit within one year of ratification, require States Parties to give CEDAW specific information regarding each of the Convention's sixteen substantive articles. The Committee does not just look for a list of implemented instruments, but also for an analysis of the success of such instruments. [n62] Furthermore, the Committee wants a full and frank discussion of any reservations made by the State Party to the Convention. [n63]

In 1988, Guidelines for the Preparation of Second and Subsequent Reports were issued by CEDAW at its 7th session. In their second and subsequent reports, States Parties should focus on the period between the consideration of their previous report up to the date of preparation of their current one. [n64] In addition, provision 3 of the CEDAW guidelines states:
In their periodic reports States Parties should have regard to the previous report and to the proceedings of the Committee in regard to that report, and should include inter alia the following:
a) legal and other measures adopted since the previous report to implement the Convention;
b) actual progress made to promote and ensure the elimination of discrimination against women;
c) any significant changes in the status and equality of women since the previous report;
d) any remaining obstacle to the participation of women on an equal basis with men in the political, social, economic and cultural life of their country;
[*142] e) matters raised by the Committee and which could not be dealt with at the time when the previous report was considered. [n65]
The guidelines are intended to give the Committee a clear picture of the status of women's human rights in the reporting country. Without the information requested in the guidelines, CEDAW will not be able to assess the progress or setbacks in women's human rights, and can neither effectively monitor nor give recommendations to help women in the reporting State.

Once a State submits its report, CEDAW, in a pre-sessional working group composed of five CEDAW members, prepares a list of issues and sets of questions based on the guidelines to be asked of the State. [n66] The pre-sessional working group meets for a week before the full CEDAW session, where the entire Committee meets with State representatives to discuss the submitted report. [n67] Under Article 20, the Committee as a whole is required to meet at the United Nations Headquarters in New York once a year for two weeks in January; at this session, CEDAW is supposed to handle all of its full meetings with State Representatives. [n68] However, since 1996, CEDAW has met twice a year, once in January and once in July, because of its inability to finish its business in the two weeks allotted under Article 20. [n69]

During the CEDAW sessions, the Committee considers the State's reports in a presentation and examination session aimed at establishing and maintaining a constructive dialogue between CEDAW and the reporting State. [n70] Government representatives spend approximately thirty minutes introducing the report and any additional information to CEDAW. [n71] Following this introduction, CEDAW members make general comments on the report as a whole, as well as on any reservations made to the [*143] Convention by the State Party. [n72] CEDAW members also consider the report on an article-by-article basis, asking questions on the implementation of the articles as well as requesting further information or clarification. At the end of this session, the government representatives of the reporting State may decide either to reply immediately to the questions asked by CEDAW or to provide answers at a meeting scheduled one or two days later. [n73] At this later meeting, CEDAW members may ask further questions or may suggest that any remaining unanswered questions be addressed in the State Party's next report.

The above question-and-answer session is "intended to create a constructive atmosphere in which information, experiences, ideas and suggestions are exchanged in a joint effort to implement the Convention in the reporting State." [n74] CEDAW intends for the session to address a wide variety of issues facing women in the reporting State, including issues not addressed by the State report:

In asking questions and raising a broad variety of issues, the Committee members as experts in their individual capacity are not limited to the information provided to them in the report submitted by the State Party. They can and do use other information, such as information reported by specialized agencies, other governmental and non-governmental sources, their own personal knowledge and other sources. The purpose of the consideration is ... to contribute in a joint effort to the advancement of women and to the implementation of the rights contained in the Convention. [n75]

In order to fully address the Convention during this question-and-answer session, CEDAW relies heavily on the work of NGOs. According to one member of the Committee,
NGOs greatly aid CEDAW's experts in their work by sharing information about the situation of women in different countries and by supporting CEDAW's decisions in international fora. NGOs in different countries have developed their own experts on CEDAW and provide, on a regular basis, special reports on the countries on CEDAW's agenda.... NGOs around the world have invited CEDAW experts to participate in various conferences they have organized on the Convention and its importance for the development of the human rights contained in the Convention. The Committee considers the support of NGOs and women's human rights activists invaluable in the combined effort to promote the Convention and increase awareness of and information on women's human rights. [n76]
[*144] Thus the reporting process has become more than just a dialogue between States Parties and CEDAW; the dialogue has also been extended to women and women's NGOs.

D. Problems of the Convention-Dictated Enforcement Mechanisms

Critics have questioned whether the reporting process is an effective method of enforcement. First, the consideration of a State's report by CEDAW is contingent upon the submission of a report by the State Party. [n77] Without a report from a given State, it is of course far more difficult to know about the status of women's human rights in that State. Unfortunately, many States are behind in fulfilling their reporting obligation; some have not even submitted a single report. [n78] Even when reports are submitted, countries under scrutiny are sensitive to any criticisms by CEDAW and are inclined to portray the status of women and the measures that they have taken in an unjustifiably favorable manner. [n79] Moreover, the accuracy of the reports has been questioned since they are prepared and presented by government officials who often do not include controversial matters in their reports. [n80]

There is also criticism of the Committee's procedures once it receives a State's report, especially concerning the Committee's limited meeting time. A report submitted to CEDAW will probably not be reviewed for a number of years, even with the present situation of overdue reports. [n81] Moreover, the time taken to review the report is limited: "When [CEDAW] eventually reviews the report, its consideration, if it is a first report, will involve two meetings; and if it is a subsequent report, it will be considered in one meeting." [n82] The Committee characterized the reporting problems with the following statement:

The backlog of reports, which itself creates a disincentive to report, and the expedition of their review are explained by article 20 of the Convention, which stipulates that the Committee shall normally meet annually no more than two weeks, a restriction which affects no other human rights treaty body. Some of the [*145] difficulties posed by this restriction include additional burdens on reporting States, which are forced to update reports that, when introduced by them to the Committee, are often several years out of date. [n83]
The Committee has attempted to resolve these problems and has requested (although no response has been given to this request) through the General Assembly an amendment to Article 20 of the Convention. [n84]

Furthermore, the Committee's reluctance to adopt formal recommendations and its lack of authority to interpret the substantive provisions of the Convention have raised questions regarding its ability to facilitate change in a State and to enforce the rights of women once it has reviewed the reports. "The Committee can formulate general analyses of the Convention's substantive provisions but has no power to authoritatively interpret them. In addition, it has no quasi-judicial power to pronounce a state in violation of the Convention." [n85] CEDAW members often make informal recommendations to States upon reviewing their reports, but not formal recommendations or suggestions directed at individual States, because no procedure exists for formulating written comments on reports. [n86]

Despite all of the criticisms of the Committee and the reporting process, the reporting process remains the only way to enforce the Convention. Therefore, it is important to explore what this enforcement procedure can do and consider how it can be strengthened. In fact, examination of a State's report under a treaty can provide an occasion for exerting domestic and international pressure on the State. [n87] With a certain amount of preparation by NGOs, the proceedings before CEDAW and the process of reporting can be used quite effectively. [n88] Part II presents a case in which a country's lack of adherence to its reporting obligations under the Convention, in addition to the lack of rights for women in the country, led to pressure by NGOs and, consequently, to greater protection for women's rights in that State.

II. CASE STUDY: BANGLADESH AND ITS LESSONS

Bangladesh ratified the Women's Convention in 1984. The periodic reports submitted by Bangladesh to CEDAW, as required by the Convention, illustrate both the benefits and the problems of the reporting system. As will be seen, Bangladesh has been inconsistent in abiding [*146] by its obligations under the Convention, especially in its reporting. However, as women's activism in Bangladesh has grown and become more targeted, the country has moved toward greater adherence to its obligations under the Convention. The record of the interaction between Bangladeshi NGOs and the government of Bangladesh is a particularly revealing account of a State that initially failed to protect women's human rights but has since responded favorably to activism by women's NGOs.

Bangladesh is a nation fraught with social and economic problems such as low literacy rates, high poverty, and high unemployment. [n89] On top of this already difficult situation, women in Bangladesh have enjoyed little protection of their fundamental human rights and often experience violence and discrimination. [n90] Despite these problems, for a number of years, the State failed to take any steps to ensure the rights of women or to abide by its obligations under the Convention.

In 1993, Bangladesh presented its Second Periodic Report [n91] ("Second Report") to CEDAW. The Second Report had numerous mistakes and gaps. [n92] Its structure and scanty length might have led one to question how seriously the government of Bangladesh took its responsibility to women's equality. While the government admitted that women in Bangladesh were discriminated against by their parents, husbands and sons, and by cultural and social norms, there seemed to be little consideration of the causes of and solutions to discrimination against Bangladeshi women.

By contrast, the combined Third and Fourth Periodic Report [n93] ("New Report"), presented to CEDAW in July 1997, was a dramatic improvement. After the presentation of the Second Report, CEDAW had urged the government to "improve its reporting procedures by seeking technical assistance in preparation of the report and by providing more detailed information in its third periodic report." [n94] Not only is the New Report written in accordance with Article 18 of the Convention, but there [*147] is also an analysis of the situation of women under all of the Articles of the Convention. [n95]

Significantly, there were changes made in the New Report's preparation process, notably the involvement of representatives of women's NGOs. [n96] This involvement had both national and international aspects. The global women's movement and national women's NGOs worked, and continue to work, hand in hand to improve Bangladeshi women's lives.

The changes in the government's approach to women's human rights and in its preparation of the New Report leads one to inquire into the reasons for these changes: What factors propelled the government of Bangladesh to be more responsive to women's issues under the Convention? Understanding these factors may enable women's rights activists to more successfully advocate within other States for greater responsiveness to the Convention as well. This Part analyzes the changes that have led to and occurred in the New Report and in the government's attitude toward its international obligations, and also assesses the involvement of women's NGOs as a factor in such changes.

A. The Second Report: Bangladesh's Noncompliance with Its Convention Obligations

Bangladesh's Second Report failed to provide adequate information on the human rights situation of Bangladeshi women. The report purported to examine the legislative and administrative measures adopted in relation to Article 16 of the Convention, ignoring the other fifteen substantive articles. [n97] Overall, the report, a short thirteen-page description of women's status in Bangladesh, did not address most of the provisions of the Convention. It did not meet the guidelines outlined in Article 18 of the Convention nor did it meet the 1988 Guidelines that were issued by CEDAW at its seventh session. [n98]

First, Bangladesh's Second Report, with mostly outdated statistics, did not comply with provision 2 of the CEDAW guidelines. [n99] The introduction to the Second Report gave a very brief list of gender-disaggregated statistics in the areas of labor force participation, literacy, educa [*148] tion, life expectancy, and political participation. [n100] The statistics were somewhat useful in depicting women's lower status in society and women's participation in the aforementioned areas, but were also incomplete since they only provided information from 1974 to 1985 (the report was presented in 1993). In addition, while some of the legal measures adopted were mentioned, the report did not include the information and specifics requested in the Guideline's provision 3(b)-(e). [n101]

CEDAW pointed out some of the problems of the report, including the fact that the guidelines regarding report form and content were not followed. CEDAW stated:
When the initial report of Bangladesh was presented, many questions were posed to its representative. Some of those were answered immediately but many were left unanswered on the basis that the second periodic report would provide the information needed. Generally speaking, the unanswered questions have not been commented on in the second periodic report. [n102]

The lack of adequate information was apparent in the questions posed by CEDAW to the government. While commending Bangladesh on enactment of laws to prevent violence against women, the Committee asked the government representatives about the extent to which the problem of violence against women contributed to Bangladeshi women's lower life expectancy, but received no adequate response. [n103] Such a question was particularly significant, in light of information given to CEDAW by NGOs that revealed that women are more likely to die from violence than die in childbirth. [n104] Yet, violence as a contributing factor to women's lower life expectancy was not addressed in the report.

Another problematic aspect of the Second Report was an apparent lack of understanding of the Convention. [n105] The critical articles of the [*149] Convention were never mentioned. Instead of detailing the measures required by the Convention, the report made broad generalizations such as: "The Government of Bangladesh has enacted and amended various necessary laws. These are in conformity with the provision of the U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and the U.N. Decade of Women." [n106] There was no mention of what these necessary laws provide nor how they conform with the Convention.

The report also failed to address legal discrimination against women in Bangladesh. During the government's report to the Committee, the Bangladeshi government representatives admitted to discriminatory provisions in Bangladesh's personal laws. [n107] Questions posed by CEDAW in response to the Second Report highlighted some of the other discriminatory aspects of the law. [n108]

Bangladesh made some other major omissions in the Second Report. First, there was little mention of the role of NGOs or women's NGOs in attempting to aid women in Bangladesh. Second, the issue of Bangladesh's reservations to the Convention was not addressed. [n109] As is [*150] clear from the questions and concerns of CEDAW, this was a major omission by Bangladesh and perhaps best demonstrated its lack of understanding of its obligations under the Convention. In its response to the Bangladesh report, CEDAW stated:
While the Government of Bangladesh ratified the Convention making reservations to articles 2, 13(a) and 16, paragraphs 1(c) and (f), during the presentation of its initial report, at the sixth session of the Committee in 1987, members had consistently questioned the need to retain the reservations to article 2. Members asked the Government to study article 2 with a view to including in its subsequent reports its comments on the legislation or other structures that were preventing it from implementing that article fully. The second periodic report of the Government of Bangladesh makes no comment on the reasons for retaining this reservation and it has not been withdrawn. [n110]
The response of the Bangladeshi government to CEDAW's concerns about reservations was that the provisions of Articles 2 and 16 of the Convention could not be adopted because they involve religious practices; these reservations thus allowed continuing discrimination. This alleged inconsistency between Islam and Articles 2 and 16 of the Convention [n111] was not addressed in the government's report.

While in its Second Report Bangladesh claimed to have demonstrated its commitment to improving women's status and ensuring a move toward women's equality, it was not apparent that the State had a full understanding of this commitment. The fact that Bangladesh had been weak in protecting human rights, mainly due to poverty, was apparent. However, particular barriers within the State structure that could hinder women's rights were not acknowledged. While Bangladesh was frank concerning some problems facing its women, the majority of problems faced by Bangladeshi women were largely ignored.


B. The Process of Change

Following the Second Report and in line with preparations for the Fourth World Conference on Women [n112] ("Beijing Conference"), women's NGOs in Bangladesh stepped up their efforts to hold the govern [*151] ment accountable for its obligation to protect women's rights. [n113] Bangladeshi women's NGOs involvement in monitoring their government began during preparations for Beijing and continued up until the preparation of the New Report. Moreover, even after the preparation of this report, women's NGOs in Bangladesh have continued to pursue progress in women's human rights. [n114]

1. The Pre-Beijing Movement. - In preparation for Beijing, women's organizations in Bangladesh formed an NGO preparatory forum in November 1993. [n115] The preparatory forum consisted of an extensive multi-pronged mobilization process, including three major activities. [n116] First, a series of workshops on the Convention and women's human rights were held at both the local and national levels. [n117] All of the workshops extended invitations to the government of Bangladesh in the hopes of building an interactive process in which both civil society and the government could become sensitized to women's issues. [n118] Second, newsletters about women's human rights were written by the Bangladeshi NGOs and widely distributed around the country. [n119] Third, a media campaign was conducted both to sensitize the media and to allow women activists to write articles for the newspapers. [n120]

With concerted activities, women's NGOs in Bangladesh were able to assert some influence over the government in the government's prepara [*152] tion for Beijing. [n121] While the government's preparation for Beijing was weak, effective mobilization by the Bangladeshi NGOs put them in a strong position to build a mechanism to hold the government account able for protecting and guaranteeing women's rights. [n122] Many national women's NGOs, such as Naripokho, [n123] reached out to local women's organizations around the country. Activists at the national level who became involved in preparations for the Beijing Conference felt that their involvement afforded them greater legitimacy and thus an opportunity to reach local-level women's organizations, many of which were long ignored in their struggles for improved human rights. [n124]

2. Beijing and After: A Catalyst for Change. - The Beijing Conference was an important turning point for women's human rights generally, and particularly for the rights of women in Bangladesh. [n125] Beijing impelled both the government and women's NGOs to step up their actions to help women. According to the Secretary of the Ministry of Women and Children's Affairs (MOWCA), Beijing made a significant impact on Bangladesh because it mapped the Bangladeshi context so closely - the issues identified in the Beijing Platform for Action [n126] in fact matched [*153] many people's perceptions about women's human rights in Bangladesh. [n127]

Following Beijing, Bangladesh's government began to formulate a National Action Plan (NAP) [n128] in order to implement both the commitments made under the Beijing Platform and those made under the Women's Convention. [n129] According to the Beijing Platform, governments have the primary responsibility for implementing measures to protect women's human rights:
Governments have the primary responsibility for implementing the Platform for Action. Commitment at the highest political level is essential for its implementation, and Governments should take a leading role in coordinating, monitoring and assessing progress in the advancement of women. The Fourth World Conference on Women is a conference of national and international commitment and action. This requires commitment from Governments and the international community. The Platform for Action is part of a continuing process and has a catalytic effect as it will contribute to programmes and practical outcomes for girls and women of all ages. States and the international community are encouraged to respond to this challenge by making commitments for action. [n130]

The governments' commitments for action were to be detailed in national plans of action:
As soon as possible, preferably by the end of 1995, Governments, in consultation with relevant institutions and non-governmental organizations, should begin to develop implementation strategies for the Platform and, preferably by the end of 1996, should have developed their strategies or plans of action. This planning process should draw upon persons at the highest level of authority in government and relevant actors in civil society. These implementation strategies should be comprehensive, have time-bound targets and benchmarks for monitoring, and include proposals for allocating or reallocating resources for implementation. Where necessary, the support of the international community could be enlisted, including resources. [n131]
[*154]
In order to develop the NAP, MOWCA was appointed as the coordinating ministry. [n132] The Department of Women's Affairs also took the initiative to follow up the commitments made at Beijing. [n133] While MOWCA established an interministerial task force ("Task Force"), the Department of Women's Affairs established a working group called the Core Group to aid the Task Force in formulating a national action plan to implement the Beijing Platform. [n134] The importance of the Task Force and the Core Group lay largely in the fact that they were comprised both of representatives from the government departments and of Bangladeshi women activists. [n135] Due to the greater flexibility of NGOs in getting projects started and their greater access to local communities, MOWCA felt that NGOs should play and had been playing the most significant role in promoting women's rights. [n136]

The Core Group worked with MOWCA to formulate a preliminary NAP. [n137] "A synthesis document of various pre-Beijing consultations, especially by [NGOs] ... was prepared and used for sectoral reviews and planning exercises with various line ministries of the Government." [n138] A national meeting which included debriefing of all the government ministries on the Beijing Platform and its relevance to particular ministries was held in May 1996. [n139] This was the largest gathering of ministers [*155] and ministries at a government meeting ever, indicating interest on the part of the different ministries in learning about Beijing and women's issues. [n140]

Sectoral assessment began in August 1996 with identification of thirteen priority ministries. [n141] Keeping in mind the Beijing Platform and the mandate and the capacity of each Ministry, sectoral teams identified the relevant sections of the Beijing Platform for each Ministry and reviewed the Ministries' activities, programs, policies and budget allocations to identify the modifications needed to accomplish the strategic objectives outlined in the Beijing Platform. [n142] Resource, personnel, and time requirements were noted, as were changes in institutional structure and mandate. [n143]

The composition of the sectoral review teams was significant. Those involved in government, particularly bureaucrats from the actual ministry responsible for carrying out proposed initiatives, were an integral part of the process. [n144] In fact, the NAP was drafted by a wide variety of actors, including MOWCA, NGOs, the NGO Preparatory Committee for the NGO Forum for Women, the Planning Commission, and thirteen government ministries (Agriculture, Education, Environment and Forestry, Fisheries and Livestock, Health and Family Welfare, Home Affairs, Industry, Labour and Manpower, Social Welfare, PMED, Home Affairs, Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs). [n145] The participation of members of women's organizations, human rights groups, research organizations, professional associations, and the private sector was especially cultivated in order to ensure the most diverse input into the assessment process. [n146] This was an important means not only of involving the ministries fully in the formulation of the NAP, but also of maintaining contact between the ministries and outside experts. Such collaboration was critical because it better secured a real commitment to the implementation of the NAP both on the part of activists and on the part of the government. [n147]

[*156] 3. The Preparation of the New Report. - The implementation of the NAP was also connected to the implementation of Bangladesh's obligations under the Convention. The significance of the NAP to the New Report was twofold. First, the process of the development of the NAP was crucial to the development of the New Report and to greater cooperation between Bangladeshi women's NGOs and their government, particularly MOWCA. Second, the NAP was important as a measuring stick to gauge how seriously the government intended to narrow the gaps (at least in writing) between full compliance with the Convention and actual achievements that were highlighted in the New Report. [n148]

Building on the NAP process, MOWCA, for the first time, formed a committee to guide the preparations of the New Report ("Report Committee"). [n149] The Report Committee included not only personnel from the government but also three prominent activists from the women's movement in Bangladesh. [n150]

Those in the government, particularly in MOWCA, who had been exposed to women's NGOs, had begun to count on NGOs to help them do their work. [n151] The actual report was written with the aid of two consultants hired by MOWCA and the Report Committee. [n152] The primary [*157] consultant, Ms. Maheen Sultan, was also involved in formulating the NAP. [n153] Also, both consultants had been involved in women's NGOs in Bangladesh. The arrangements for preparing the New Report, therefore, were a continuation of the collaboration between women's NGOs and the government that had been recently formed during the development of the NAP. [n154]

Not only were women's NGOs involved in the preparation of the report, but they were also involved with CEDAW's analysis of the report. International Women's Rights Action Watch-Asia Pacific (IWRAW-AP), for example, had formed a strong bond with activists from Bangladesh, which therefore increased their access to the UN system. [n155] Prior to the presentation of Bangladesh's report in July, IWRAW-AP had organized a group of Bangladeshi women to attend the January 1997 sessions of CEDAW so that they could effectively lobby the Committee and present committee members with accurate accounts of the situation of women in Bangladesh. [n156] These activists were again present at the July 1997 CEDAW sessions, providing the Committee with information that highlighted missing aspects of the official report. [n157]

In addition to analyzing interaction between the government and national women's NGOs, it is important to document the role that the relationship between domestic women's NGOs and transnational women's NGOs played in the changes that occurred in Bangladesh's reporting process to CEDAW. The mutually interactive process that took place between CEDAW, Bangladeshi women activists, and transnational women's NGOs could be the beginning of a new era in the enforcement of the State's international obligations. [n158]

C. Results: The New Report and Its Lessons

The results of the process described above are pronounced. Not only has a culture of cooperation and information-sharing developed be [*158] tween the Bangladeshi government and women's NGOs, but the result of this cooperation was a New Report that actually presented a more factually accurate and fair account of the status of women's human rights in Bangladesh. Moreover, further efforts to advance women's human rights have been made and are continuing since the completion of the 1997 report - evidence of the tangible benefits of increasing cooperation between governments and women's NGOs.

1. The New Report. - In a dramatic improvement, Bangladesh's New Report was written in compliance with Article 18 of the Convention and the guidelines established by CEDAW. [n159] Qualitatively, it is a tremendous improvement over the Second Report, both with respect to the information provided and the analysis undertaken. In addition, the report is well-organized and fact-intensive. [n160]

The report is divided into three major sections, beginning with a background section on Bangladesh and the status of Bangladeshi women, which attempts to present the multi-faceted factors that have led to violations of women's rights. The second section of the report presents a progress report on Articles 2 through 16 of the Convention. The third section of the report is about measures taken by the government to implement the Beijing Platform.

The government admits that "traditional cultural, social and religious values and practices have reinforced the lower status of women accorded to them in society and have limited their opportunities for education, technical and vocational training, employment and participation in the overall development process." [n161] Moreover, the report presents the disparate effects on women of situations such as poverty. While poverty negatively affects all, it has a particularly pronounced effect on women because they bear a disproportionate burden from having to manage both the household production and consumption more often than men. [n162] The report also notes that the role of women should not only be conceived of in economic terms, but also in terms of education, training and job opportunities, income, employment, assets, health, and the role they play in the family and in society. [n163] Also, as required by CEDAW, there are current (1990-1996) sex-disaggregated statistics on women. [n164] [*159] The report's approach is not only to present the statistical data but also to present some of the factors that have led to the results. [n165]

Discussion of Articles 2 through 16 emphasizes new legal measures, policies, and programs to eliminate discrimination against women, as well as remaining obstacles to achieving women's equality, including reservations to the Convention. Bangladesh has reservations to Articles 2, 13(a), 16(1)(a) and 16(1)(f), but all of the reservations made to the Convention by Bangladesh are under review by MOWCA. [n166] Regarding reservations, the New Report states:
[T]here have been many recent case[s] ... where the higher judiciary is upholding, protecting and defending the Constitution ... restricting the scope and application of laws that are inconsistent with the Constitution and therefore deemed to be automatically void. Articles 16(1)(c) and 16(1)(f) are specific areas of discrimination that are highlighted and the general provisions of equality before the law both under Article 2 of CEDAW as well as Article 27, 28, 29 and 31 under the Constitution, are wider in their application and scope, thereby encompassing the more specific articles. In addition, it is also to be noted that in respect of inheritance rights, Bangladesh has also committed itself to Article 247(d) of the PFA as adopted in the Fourth World Conference on Women. Therefore the obligation under Article 16(1)(f) is not new.
Since the obligations implied in the Articles 16(1)(c) and 16(1)(f) are less than the full constitutional obligations and mandate, when Bangladesh removes all reservations the State will not be undertaking any new obligations or mandate. [n167]
Thus, the New Report surprisingly admits the incompatibility of the reservations made to the Convention with the provisions in the Constitution and also with Bangladesh's other international obligations. [n168]

[*160] In Bangladesh, major obstacles exist to carrying out even the basic fundamental rights guaranteed to women under Article 2. The report mentions obstacles in the government system and obstacles in society in general:
Although the Government is determined to take steps to eliminate discrimination against women through legal measures, women cannot even enjoy those rights provided by existing laws due to the lack of enforcement. The disparity ... arises partly from the lack of knowledge ... about internationally and nationally recognized women's rights and the lack of commitment by the judiciary and law enforcement agencies. [n169]
Furthermore, procedural rules also make it difficult for women to demand their rights. [n170]

The most significant difference between the Second Report and the New Report is the change in the understanding of the State's responsibility. While the State's responsibility was weakly acknowledged in the Second Report, in the New Report there seems to be a greater understanding of Bangladesh's obligations to women's human rights under the Convention. For example, the report candidly states: "Bangladesh is committed to its international treaty obligations and the guarantees of equality between men and women and of non-discrimination against women contained in the U.N. Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international instruments." [n171] Rather than making blanket statements regarding the degree to which Bangladesh has complied with the Convention, the New Report acknowledges the country's weaknesses and lays out a plan of action for its future.

Throughout, the New Report expresses the State's determination to take action to achieve full compliance with the Convention. For example, concerning dissemination of information about the Convention, it states: "The Government is responsible for the dissemination of information on various human rights instruments and the legal provisions on human rights that have been ratified." [n172] While some human rights instruments such as the Convention have been translated into Bangla, the New Report admits that the translation and dissemination of such instruments had been done by NGOs and that its own efforts so far had been limited and inadequate. [n173]

In the New Report, recognition of Bangladesh's weaknesses in implementing the Convention includes an understanding of the need for NGO involvement and help. The report acknowledges the efforts of NGOs in preparing for the Beijing Conference, in discussing the Convention, and [*161] in reviewing reservations to the Convention. In addition, the importance of NGO-aided training in the institutionalization of gender training has been accepted. [n174] As the report recognizes, gender sensitization with the help of NGOs "will be an important means of changing attitudes toward women within the Government and thereby changing the approach of various policies, programmes and projects." [n175] Furthermore, the advocacy that has been undertaken by women's organizations has been acknowledged by the government as making it more conscious of various violence-related issues. [n176]

The New Report also cites the success of the NGOs in their direct efforts at community outreach. The activities of NGO initiatives that have created employment opportunities for women, particularly rural and poor women, are detailed in the report. NGOs have been significant in supplementing the government's efforts at socio-economic development. The report states:
The importance and contribution of NGOs in national development is well recognized and the Government seeks to utilize their services in a coordinated way. About 18,000 NGOs are playing a creative and innovative role in improving the conditions of the poor and disadvantaged. [NGOs] are also involved specially in technology dissemination and training of target groups. Some of these NGO programmes have made marked contributions towards poverty alleviation. [n177]
As can be seen from the above statement, the process of collaboration between the government and NGOs that began in 1993 has led to an increase in the government's recognition of its obligations under the Convention and to efforts to comply with the Convention through better reporting and through measures to advance women's human rights. [n178]

2. Results. - The New Report was formulated with the vision of guaranteeing women equal access to opportunities and full enjoyment of their human rights in order to realize the goals of equality, participation, and sustained development. A number of positive results came about after the preparation and presentation of the New Report; this section will discuss a few of the changes that have taken place. This is, however, just a beginning for implementation of the Convention and for guaranteeing the rights of women.

Violence against women has been recognized in the New Report as a social and cultural pattern of conduct that is based on the view of women as inferior. [n179] Thus, MOWCA has begun to prepare an integrated project [*162] to address violence against women, involving the judiciary, the police force, the medical community, and the media. [n180] Efforts such as this evidence an increased awareness, at least on the part of some in the government, of the barriers to equality that arise from violence against women, and a greater sense of accountability for the advancement of women's human rights.

Under Article 7 of the Convention, States are obliged to eliminate discrimination against women in political life and to allow women to be eligible for election and to hold office on an equal basis with men. [n181] Bangladesh has taken two important steps toward fulfilling these obligations. First, thirty of the 330 parliamentary seats have been reserved for women. [n182] Second, an important step toward women's political participation was made in 1997 when, for the first time, the government allowed women to run directly for office, especially in the important local government (union council) elections. [n183] Turnout of women voters in these elections, held in December 1997, was unprecedented. "The provision of direct election for women has injected a sense of self-respect and self- confidence among them in running the day to day activities of union councils ... their views will be heard with respect." [n184] Furthermore, NGOs have also taken part in the process to increase women's political power:
Proshika, one of Bangladesh's largest NGOs ... will be organizing month-long training courses from mid-February for the newly elected women council members. The courses are to be held at the seven divisional headquarters of the country, with financial help from UNICEF, the U.N. children's agency.
[*163] The women will be trained to become efficient council members: how to deal with the federal government, scrutinise government and NGO development initiatives, tax imposition and realization, arbitrating in small disputes, and maintenance of law and order.
With women constituting a third of union council members across the country, a quiet revolution has taken place in Bangladesh. [n185]

The government has also made efforts to increase women's reproductive rights. With the help of NGOs, Bangladesh has been rather successful in its family planning program. [n186] Every month, the government spends almost $12 million on its birth control program. [n187] Furthermore, it "has trained nearly 25,000 family welfare assistants to take the contraception message to every village home. Their work is supervised by some 4,500 family inspectors, and as many family welfare visitors, who are volunteers." [n188] The National Population Council, headed by the Prime Minister, formulated the government program in order to help women who desired to have smaller families. Under the Bangladesh Integrated Nutrition Program (BINP), the government has also been providing food supplements to women and children in the hopes that "the BINP will increase the child survival rate in Bangladesh, which in turn will lead to improvements in women's health and lower birth rates." [n189]

Another important step came about during the presentation of the report to CEDAW in July 1997: Bangladesh withdrew its reservations pertaining to Articles 13(a) and 16(1)(f) of the Convention. [n190] However, Bangladesh still maintains its reservations to Articles 2 and 16(1)(c) of the Convention. [n191] This was quite a disappointment to women activists [*164] who see Article 2 as an integral aspect of State obligations under the Convention. [n192]

There is still a lack of full commitment by the State to eliminate all forms of discrimination against women. This was evident when the large Bangladeshi government team presented the New Report to CEDAW in July 1997. [n193] One member of the team made clear that Bangladesh's government would never change personal laws in the country, despite the discriminatory aspects of the personal laws. [n194] Therefore, women's NGOs must continue their struggle to pressure the government and all of its different ministries to eliminate discrimination against women.

There are two major reasons for the disparity between the commitments to women's rights that Bangladesh professed in its New Report and its failure to follow up on these commitments when it presented the report. The first reason is political. While MOWCA is one of thirteen government ministries, it does not have the same power and political clout as, for example, the Law Commission, one of the most important ministries in Bangladesh. [n195] In essence, MOWCA is just a catalyst in the process of changed government policies toward women. MOWCA did not have a political mandate from the other ministries to make all of the com [*165] mitments that it made in the New Report. [n196] Neither MOWCA nor the NGOs who worked with it on the report mobilized the necessary internal political support and political pressure on the different government ministries to hold them accountable for the newly expressed commitments to women's rights. As many women's NGOs have realized, getting standards for women's human rights implemented at the local level is not just a matter of treaty law and international legal obligations of States, but is rather a matter of mobilizing the State's political will and capabilities. [n197]

The second reason for the disparity, which is closely related to the first, concerns the relationship formed in Bangladesh between MOWCA and women's NGOs. The New Report, while approved by a government ministry (MOWCA), was written by members of women's NGOs. [n198] In its criticism of existing government policies and lack of enforcement of the Convention, the report at times seems to resemble more an NGO report than a government report. n199 However, when working with governments, NGOs must also keep their separate identities and still monitor the State's real commitments to women's human rights. [n200] Thus, they must play roles both within the system and outside of it.

Even prior to the reporting in July, it was clear that Bangladeshi NGOs were not necessarily convinced by the government's pronounced commitment to the implementation of human rights standards. [n201] In fact, disturbingly, the attitude of some in the government was that it is the government's task to formulate policy in this area while NGOs are the [*166] actual implementers of these policies. [n202] However, under the Convention, the State is obligated both to formulate policy and to implement that policy. [n203] While NGOs can be helpful allies, they are not the ones with the primary responsibility to abide by a State's treaty obligations. They must be careful not to become a parallel State.

Maintenance of Bangladesh's reservations to Articles 2 and 16(1)(c) highlights the problems that are yet to be addressed by both NGOs and the government. The process that took place between 1993 and 1997 was a significant step in advancing women's human rights, but it will not have its full intended effect without further action by all sectors of the government.

III. THE ROLE OF NGOs IN THE CEDAW SYSTEM

The progress of Bangladeshi NGOs in enforcing their State's obligations under the Convention was due in large part to the mutually interactive process between their work and the work of international women's organizations. While Part II concentrated on the role of domestic NGOs, this Part addresses the role of international NGOs in implementing the Convention.

Women are conscious of the fact that their interests find little specific recognition in the doctrines and institutions of the international legal system and international relations. While women have not been necessarily ignored, they have been spoken for by men and by agencies and institutions that have catered to men's interests and that men have dominated. "The invisibility of women to States has led to their mutual alienation. States do not usually seek a woman's perspective in policymaking, and women often do not rely on or trust States to serve their interests." [n204]

Even modern international human rights law, which claims to protect women's human rights, fails to fully incorporate women's voices and secure women's rights. Women's grievances frequently go unheard because women are often denied a voice before an audience that is capable of advancing international human rights law. [n205] Women's NGOs therefore play an important role because they allow women to have their voices heard in the international community:
Momentum for the development of women's rights is coming from the rising generations of women who are aware of their marginalization and their entitlement to equality. The educational function of international human rights instruments is two [*167] fold: they advise the powerful regarding their duties, and educate those unaccustomed to power of their rights and means to enforce them .... Enforcement of instruments like the Women's Convention depends both on monumental combat before high tribunals and on the individual's assertions of her rights. [n206]

The Convention does not have any explicit provision for NGO input or involvement in the enforcement of women's rights. [n207] CEDAW, however, has attempted to open NGO access to its proceedings and has welcomed input from NGOs. [n208] CEDAW has recognized that NGOs have a wealth of information available to them and can often contribute accurate data about the status of women in the States Parties.

International and national NGOs have for some time provided information to CEDAW. Some NGOs, such as International Women's Rights Action Watch, have directly provided CEDAW with alternative reports. [n209] Alternative reports not only provide CEDAW with needed independent information from which to question States Parties, but, for many local NGOs, alternative reports "are also useful tools for educating the public, building coalitions, strengthening their own methods for holding the government accountable for rights violations, and influencing policy or law reform." [n210] Ideally, the preparation of alternative reports should contribute to initiatives and coalitions for women's human rights, while the actual reports contribute to the work of CEDAW in promoting women's human rights.

The receptivity of CEDAW to NGO involvement has increased in its most recent sessions. While CEDAW has yet to institute a formal process for working with representatives from NGOs, CEDAW members have been very accessible to NGOs and have shown an intense desire to receive information from them such as alternative reports about reporting States. [n211] At its 16th Session in January of 1997, the Committee decided that the U.N. should facilitate informal meetings where NGOs could offer information on the reporting countries. [n212] Two informal meetings were [*168] scheduled during the 17th Session of the Committee in July of 1997. [n213] At the commencement of the 16th Session, the Director of the United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women (DAW), Angela King, acknowledged NGO presence, stating:
The Committee will be taking up the important question of relations with non-governmental organizations during its present session. The Secretariat has prepared a thorough review of the experience of other treaty bodies in this regard. I am pleased to note that UNIFEM and International Women Rights Action Watch (Asia/Pacific) have made it possible for a number of NGOs to attend this session of the Committee .... We would therefore like to suggest that the Committee consider holding an informal joint meeting of its two working groups with interested NGOs .... [n214]
At the conclusion of CEDAW's session in July 1997, Angela King said there was a revolution in CEDAW's approach to NGOs and their contribution to its work. [n215] CEDAW decided that "it would ... welcome the input of [non-governmental] organizations.... Their role in the process should be acknowledged and their interaction with the Committee should be formalized." [n216]

As evidenced by the Bangladesh case study, NGO participation in the reporting process is an important factor in inducing States to comply with their obligations under the Convention. Although the reporting process is far from perfect, the process of reporting and its effects do influence States when their citizens and others in the international community, such as international NGOs, take note of the proceedings, monitor how the State is perceived internationally, and apply pressure to the government to improve its international image by enforcing the Convention. [n217] The Committee also promotes this phenomenon:
[*169] CEDAW will seek information on the role of NGOs in the preparation of the report, whether the Convention and the obligations that it creates are widely known in the country and whether it has been translated into any local languages. CEDAW will usually ask whether people at the local level have been made aware of the contents of the report and if the report itself has been made widely available and translated into any local languages. [n218]
CEDAW's encouragement of participation by non-government actors is crucial in giving an opportunity to women's NGOs to participate in the enforcement of the Convention.

Women's NGOs are also a valuable source of reliable information, especially when presenting alternative reports that tend to be more objective and substantive than those submitted by the States. [n219] They have greater contact with the local population and the least empowered groups of women, people whom the Convention was designed to reach. The involvement of women's NGOs makes the Convention and CEDAW's existence better known, empowering women by making them more aware of their rights and their State's obligations. Southard correctly states that
with no mandate to include women in the process of implementing [the Convention], the decision-makers in the States Parties to [the Convention] will most likely continue to think about women in the same old ways. Change will definitely not be effective if women are not included in the formulation of change .... [n220]

For the past four years women's NGOs have made a pronounced effort to have their voices heard in the UN system and in the international human rights community. [n221] Women's NGOs have increased their work [*170] in regard to the CEDAW process and have made concerted efforts to be a constructive and powerful part of the enforcement of the Convention.

A very effective campaign has been the one that is being implemented by IWRAW-AP and UNIFEM. [n222] IWRAW-AP and UNIFEM had arranged for representatives from national women's NGOs, including Bangladeshi women, from the States presenting reports to the Committee that year to attend the January 1997 CEDAW sessions. Again in January 1998, IWRAW-AP and UNIFEM, one week prior to the CEDAW sessions, conducted a training seminar for 25 women from national NGOs, educating them about the Convention, State obligations to implement and enforce the human rights of women, equality and non-discrimination, the UN human rights system, treaties under international law, and how to lobby within the UN system, specifically lobbying CEDAW. [n223] During the January 1998 sessions, the working groups of CEDAW, which are smaller groups of CEDAW members who review State reports and compile questions to ask of the State representatives, met with representatives from NGOs and used the NGO alternative reports as guidelines for the questions they posed to the State. [n224]

The women from the national NGOs, who had observed the CEDAW sessions, especially their own country's presentation, were able to make informal contacts with Committee members and with other NGOs, to observe the dialogue between CEDAW and the governments and to observe the development of the concluding comments. [n225] The national activists who attended this training found it integral to their work in helping to enforce the Convention in their States. [n226] An NGO representative from Morocco found that the training session allowed her to approach her government, with which she had no previous direct contact, and to arrange a follow-up meeting: "She felt strongly that this approach validated her work and the work of the NGO coalition and would strengthen their ability to approach the government on their return [home]." [n227]

The IWRAW-AP and UNIFEM campaign has attempted to overcome the problems of the Convention-dictated enforcement mechanisms that were discussed in Part I.D. The idea that women's NGOs could impact the treaty system has been a major impetus for the program sponsored by these two organizations. [n228] Another reason for the program was "the extent to which CEDAW as a Committee lagged behind the Geneva-based treaty bodies in developing formal or informal links with NGOs, both as sources of independent information and as constituents whose efforts [*171] strengthen women's human rights promotion at the national and international levels." [n229]

Cooperation between national NGOs and international NGOs can lead to effective methods to have their voices heard both by CEDAW and by their governments. [n230] As it did in the case of Bangladesh, such cooperation can lead to greater compliance by governments with obligations to protect and promote women's human rights. The contact between CEDAW and both national and international NGOs must continue if women's rights are to be protected. NGOs have the ability to bring to the women's rights treaty system well-documented fact-based information combined with honed legal analysis that addresses the concerns expressed in the Convention. [n231] The Committee itself, too, must work internally to overcome its weaknesses, including its limited meeting time and weak powers to comment on State actions or reprimand States. NGOs can be important allies for CEDAW as it battles these problems.

CONCLUSION

Despite growth in the protection of human rights, violations of women's human rights continue. Therefore, it is increasingly important to take all necessary steps to eliminate discrimination against women. The Women's Convention is the most important legal tool available to help alleviate problems faced by women globally. One hundred and sixty States have ratified the Convention, taking on an international treaty obligation to protect and promote women's human rights, which if fully implemented could have sweeping ramifications for the lives of women throughout the world.

The implementation of the Convention, however, has been problematic. States have often ignored their human rights treaty obligations. But recently, there has been a concerted effort to increase State accountability. Alice Miller correctly states that
there is a great interest among local and national women's groups in using the treaty system for human rights protection, much of it emerging from the explosive growth of human rights as the language of empowerment for women in all regions and stoked by the dramatic priority given to it through the world conferences. [n232]
[*172] International human rights treaties, such as the Convention, can empower women to demand their rights, and can be used to hold governments accountable for the protection of human rights.

NGOs may learn from the experience of women's NGOs in Bangladesh that empowered themselves to demand their rights. That case study shows the benefits of a savvy strategy to increase cooperation between non-governmental and governmental entities, thus increasing NGO access to positions of power. The Bangladesh case study shows a maturation in the way women's organizations worked with the government. Women's NGOs in Bangladesh understood the need to be both in the State and in the streets as grassroots activists. [n233] However, as the setbacks in Bangladesh illustrated, it is also important for NGOs to recognize the limitations of the State. As they cooperate with the State, they must also present themselves as a political constituency that cannot be ignored.

It is the limitations of the State that make it crucial for national and international women's NGOs to work together in order to focus greater attention on women's human rights and in order to bring greater pressure on States Parties to abide by the Convention. International women's NGOs can and have created the process by which change can be effected. Through concerted action they have created a fertile field in the CEDAW system for the inclusion of the voices of women's NGOs. Most significantly, women have developed an enforcement mechanism for the Convention when no real mechanism was provided for them, thereby carving out a role for themselves in the international legal community that has been denied to them for so long.

ENDNOTES

n1. See generally Murtaza Mandli-Yadav, Rights: U.N.'s Mixed Findings on Progress For Women, Inter Press Service, July 13, 1998, available in 1998 WL 5988245. The author was an intern at International Women's Rights Action Watch-Asia Pacific during the summer of 1997. This Note developed from work done during the internship.

n2. Just one example of extreme abuse and oppression of women is the treatment of women in Afghanistan by the Taliban. Afghan women, who must always be shrouded in the head-to-toe covering of their burqa, are not allowed to work, to leave their homes unless accompanied by a male relative, or to go to school. These hardships on Afghan women are further exacerbated by the fact that years of violent fighting in Afghanistan have left tens of thousands of women without husbands or male relatives. See Kathy Gannon, Taliban Rules Weigh on Afghan Women, AP Online, Oct. 12, 1998, available in 1998 WL 21171108; see also EU/Afghanistan: Commission Launches New Initiatives to Help Women, European Report, Feb. 4, 1998, available in 1998 WL 8800436.

n3. U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, opened for signature Mar. 1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981) [hereinafter "Convention" or "Women's Convention"]. The United Nations General Assembly in a unanimous vote adopted the Women's Convention in 1979. The Convention entered into force as a binding treaty on September 3, 1981, after ratification by twenty States. As of July 1997, 160 States have either ratified or acceded to the Convention, making it among the international human rights treaties with the most ratifications.See Committee on Elimination of Discrimination Against Women Concludes Seventeenth Session at Headquarters, 7-25 July, Press Release WOM/999, 359th